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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

VINCENT L. BELGARD,

Case No. 15743

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal

fro~

a conviction of Automobile Homicide,

a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207
(1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION

rn

THE LOWER COURT

The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, was charged by Information with the offense of Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as
amended) (T.6, Vol.II).

On November 17, 1977, the appellant

was convicted by a jury of the offense charged in the Information.

On March 17, 1978, the appellant was sentenced by the

above entitled Court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge presiding,
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to zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, seeks reversal of the
judgment of guilt entered against him and a reversal of the
instant case to the trial court with instructions to dimiss
the complaint.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts adduced at trial are as follows.

At approxi-

mately 1:00 p.m. on the 28th day of July, 1977, appellant was
involved in an automobile-bicycle accident at the intersection
of 7th East and 33rd South, in Salt Lake County.

Appellant did

not stop at the accident scene, but continued south on 7th East
pursued by three private citizens:

Mr. Alan Harenberg (T.89,

Vol. II), Mr. Jerry R. Hiller (T. 6, Vol. III), and Mr. Uffe
Traeden (T. 25, Vol.III).

These individuals pursued appellant

to a cul-de-sac on 3835 South 600 East, where appellant's
vehicle came to a rest (T. 96, Vol.II), whereupon Mr. Harenburg
placed appellant under a citizen's arrest (T. 98, Vol.II).
Trooper Lynn Thompson of the Utah Highway Patrol took
appellant into custody (T.49, Vol.III).

Although there was

evidence that appellant had been drinking, he was not given a
field sobriety test (T.65, Vol.III).

Instead, Trooper Thompson

took appellant to St. Mark's Hospital, explaining the Utah

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Implied Consent Law to him and stating that if appellant refused
a blood alcohol test, he would lose his driver's license (T.50,
Vol.I).

Appellant, an American Indian, indicated that he did

not want to take such a test, as it was against "God's Law"
(T.50, Vol.I).

Trooper Thompson reiterated that the test would

be taken, by force if necessary (T.54, Vol.I).

Appellant

renewed his objection; however, at the hospital, he permitted
himself to be placed on a gurney.

At 2:35 p.m. on the same

day, Kay Fowler, a registered nurse employed by the City-County
Health Department, withdrew blood from appellant for the blood
alcohol test (T.69-70, Vol.III).
by two individuals.

That blood sample was tested

Lynn Davis, a chemist for the City-County

Health Department, tested the blood sample at 10:20 a.m. on
August 1, 1977, and found that it contained 0.28% alcohol by
weight (T.90, Vol.III).

Dr. Darrell Murdock analyzed the same

blood sample and came to the conclusion that it contained 0.20%
alcohol by weight (T.148, Vol.III).
The victim of the accident, a sixteen year old male named
Michael Winn, was transported to St. Mark's Hospital.

He died

at 8:30 p.m., the evening of the accident, due to massive
cerebral edema, swelling of the brain (T.54, Vol.II).
On August 1, 1977, appellant was brought before Justice
of the Peace Charles A. Jones, where he was arrainged on charges
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, improper
and fraudulent registration, no driver's license, and no inspec-
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tion (M.6-8).

No formal complaint accompanied the appellant

(M.8); instead, he was arraigned from a booking and property
record (M.21).

Judge Jones contacted the County Attorney's

Office, and after being assured that two formal complaints woul1
be forthcoming, he proceeded with the arraingment (M.8-9, 30).
That complaint was never received (M.9).
Judge Jones advised appellant of his rights, particularly
the right to counsel (M.10), and his right to trial by jury
(M.10-11).

Appellant waived those rights, pleaded guilty to

the charges, and was sentenced by Judge Jones (M.11-13).

Judge

Jones sent a connnitment order to the Salt Lake County Jail pursuant to the results of the hearing (M.13).
On August 3, 1977, Joseph Tesch and Spencer Austin of
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, went to Judge Jones
and petitioned for an order vacating and setting aside the
results of the arraingment.

Judge Jones signed the order,

which was then presented to the County Jail (M.15,65).

That

same day, the County Attorney's Office filed a complaint of
Automobile Homicide against appellant.

Trial connnenced on

November 15, 1977.
In the preliminary hearing, and at trial, appellant's
counsel offered a motion to dismiss the charge of automobile
homicide, based on the single episode provision of Utah Code
Ann. §76-1-402(2)

(1953 as amended)

(M.3, T.4, Vol.I).

The

trial court ruled that the Justice of the Peace had no juris-
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diction over the proceeding before his involving the appellant;
hence it was a nullity and the single episode provision inapplicable (T.73, Vol.I).

Appellant's counsel next offered a

motion to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground
that the taking violated appellant's constitutional rights
(T.4, Vol.I).

The trial court denied that motion on the grounds

that exigent circumstances required the taking of the blood
test (T.3, Vol.II).

Finally, appellant's counsel objected to

testimony offered by Officer Clark Bowles, extrapolating the
blood alcohol level back from the time of the test to the time
of the accident, on grounds that such testimony was inadmissible
because the State could not show when appellant had consumed
his last drink (T.144, Vol.III).

Counsel's objection was

overruled.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime of Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the
Information, and judgment was entered thereon.

Appellant

now takes this appeal from the trial court.

- 5 -
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS
OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL ANALYSIS BECAUSE TAKING THE
BLOOD SAMPLE AGAINST HIS WILL VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
In the 1966 case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1966),
the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that
the federal "exclusionary rule", under which evidence obtained
from an unlawful search or seizure is inadmissible in a crimina:
trial, applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since that time, the well recognized rule has been that if
it is found that evidence was obtained in violation of a person
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Cons ti tu·
tion, it may not be used against the person in a criminal
proceeding.

In~.

the defendant was convicted of having

pornographic material in her possession.

Such material was

the basis of her conviction, although it was discovered by an
unlawful search of defendant's home.

The Court reasoned that

the assurance against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless if
evidence obtained illegally could be freely used in court.
The Court held:
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Since the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforeceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government. 367 U.S. 643, 655.
POINT A
THE BLOOD SAMPLE WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT'S RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES.
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court was faced with a case factually
similar to the case at bar.

There, the defendant was convicted

of driving an automobile while under the influence .of intoxieating liquor.

The defendant was arrested at a hospital where

he received treatment for injuries suffered in an accident
involving the automobile he had been driving.

The officer who

made the arrest smelled liquor on defendant's breath at the
scene of the accident and at the hospital.

On the basis of

his observations, the officer ordered a physician to take a
blood sample from defendant.

Defendant refused to consent to

the blood test, on the advice of counsel, but the sample was
drawn against his consent.

At trial, the defendant objected

to the admission of the blood analysis in evidence, contending
it violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

- 7 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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Although the Schmerber Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction, it recognized his privacy interest in his own
blood.

The Court stated that a compulsory administration of

a blood test:
. . plainly involves the broadly conceived
reach of a search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.
That Amendment expressly
provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.
"
.It could not reasonably be argued .
that the administration of the blood test
in this case was free of the constraints
of the Fourth Amendment.
Such testing
procedures plainly constitute searches of
"persons", and depend antecedently.upon
seizures of "persons", within the meaning
of that Amendment.
[Emphasis in original]
384 U.S. 757, 767.
Having thus found that the Fourth Amendment applies to compulsory extraction of blood, the Court went on to find that under
the facts presented by Schmerber, the search was not "unreasonable", based upon the fact that the officer had probable cause
to believe the defendant was intoxicated and that evidence of
intoxication would soon be destroyed by the body's process of
eliminating alcohol.

However, the Court recognized that its

holding may have been different in another situation:
Petitioner is not one of the few who on
grounds of fear, concern for health, or
religious scriple might prefer some other
means of testing, such as the "breathalyzer"
test petitioner refused.
. We need not
decide whether such wishes would have to be
respected.
384 U.S. 757, 771.
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The Court further limited Schmerber to its facts in its coneluding statement:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this
judgment only on the facts of the present record.
The integrity of an individuals person is a
cherished value of society. That we today hold
that the Constitution does not forbid the states
minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates
that it permits more substantial intrusions, or
intrusions under other conditions.
384 U.S. 757, 772.
Appellant contends that since the blood sample in this
case was obtained against his wishes and

~~

violation of his re-

ligious scruples, this case falls within the exception implicity
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber,
supra, to the rule established in that case.

Appellant was

placed under arrest soon after the incident by Officer Lynn
Thompson of the Utah Highway Patrol (T.40, Vol.I).

Although

appellant had suffered extensive injuries, he emphatically
refused any medical attention officer by the officer (T.40,
Voll).

Appellant was then transported by the officer to St.

Mark's Hospital to obtain treatment and a blood sample to test
blood alochol content (T.43, Vol.I).

The officer informed

appellant that under the Implied Consent Law, if he refused to
submit to a blood alochol test he would lose his license to
drive for one year (T.50, Vol.I).

At the hospital, appellant

again indicated he did not want medical attention (T.44, Vol.I).
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Appellant's religious convictions must be appraised in
light of the fact that he is a Native American, raised on the
Turtle Mountain Reservation in South Dakota.

When Officer

Thompson informed appellant that he would have to submit to
a blood test, and that due to the seriousness of the injuries
of the victim, under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended
he would be forced to take such a test, appellant repeatedly
refused to consent on the basis that it was "against God's
Law" (T.47,50,52,53, Vol.I).
was taken (T.48,54, Vol.I).

Nevertheless, the blood sample
Appellant's counsel moved to

suppress the results of the analysis of appellant's blood
(T.62, Vol.I), which motion was denied by Judge Jay E. Banks
(T.3, Vol.II).

Appellant argues that the failure to suppress such evidenc
was reversible error.

At the time the blood sample was obtaine

appellant made clear that such a procedure violated his religio'
beliefs.

Yet no attempt was made to substitute for the blood

test either a breath or urine test, both of which are approved
in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.lO(a)

(1953 as amended).

Under the

reasoning of Schmerber, supra, where a person refuses to consen

to a blood test on religious grounds, a result opposite to that
reached in Schmerber

is

appropriate. Given the circumstance:

of this case, appellant contends that taking a blood sample
against his will was an unreasonable intrusion into his body

(which he as a Native American believes should remain inviolate

thus Law
violated
his forrights
Amendment
to Service
the
ponsored by theand
S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
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provided the
by the Fourth
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and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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United States Constitution.

As such, the evidence obtained

from the blood test should have been excluded under the
authority of Mapp v. Ohio, supra.
POINT B
APPELLANT WAS COMPELLED THROUGH THE THREATENED USE
OF FORCE TO PERMIT THE BLOOD SAMPLE TO BE TAKEN.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that invasions into
the person warrant the most stringent protection of the Fourth
Amendment's right to privacy.

In Rochir. v. California, 342

U.S. 165 (1952), the defendant was convicted of possession of
Morphine.

When officers entered defendant's home, he quickly

put two pills in his mouth.

The officers jumped on the defendant,

attempting to extract the pills by violent means.

The defertdant

was then taken to a hospital, where an emetic was forced into his
stomach against his will, forcing him to vomit.

The pills

were recovered and used in evidence at trial.
In reversing defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court
wrote:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of the somach's contents--this
course of proceeding by agents of government
to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods
too close to the rack and screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation.
342 U.S. 165, 172.
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In this case, although such force was never applied to
the appellant's person, Trooper Lynn Thompson, the arresting
officer, made it clear that he would use force,
in order to obtain the blood sample.

if necessary,

He testified as follows,

in response to questions from appellant's counsel:

Q.

You indicated to him at that point that
if he refused to take the test you would take
it by force, is that correct?

A.

Yes, I indicated he would be restrained.

*

*

Q.

How many times did you tell him if you
don't take the test we are going to have to
take it from you by force?

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

More than once?

A.
I am sure more than once.
(T. 54, Vol.I)
Even as the conduct in Rochin was shocking, so too in this
case the indiscriminate threats of violence applied by officen
of the law against the appellant's person is "close to the
rack and screw".

The fine line between psychological and physi

cal intimidation blurs when compared to the stringent protectio
guaranteed to an individual's person by the Fourth Amendment
and Rochin.

Permitting such conduct will undercut these

constitutional protections and will subject appellant and
others to random threats of violence by law enforcement officer
to secure by proscribed means that which they cannot obtain
freely and legally.

- 12by -the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT C
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-207(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD, PERMITTING CHEMICAL TEST RESULTS AS
EVIDENCE WITHOUT REGARD TO A DEFENDANT'S CONSENT.
Appellant further submits that insofar as Utah Code Ann.

§76-5-207(2) (1953 as amended) allows that the results of any
chemical test administered on a defendant with or without his
consent will be admissible in evidence subject only to the rules
of evidence, is unconstitutionally overbroad.

This is because

under this provision, any chemical test, no matter how administered, and regardless of whom it is administered to, will be
admissible.

This provision sweeps too broadly in violation

of the constitutional principles laid down in

~'

Rochin

and Schmerber, supra.

POINT D
THE BLOOD SAMPLE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
REFRAIN FROM GIVING EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF.
The blood sample taken also violated appellant's rights
under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah.

The relevant portion of Article I, Section 12 provides:

"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself . . . "

From the outset, it must be remembered that this

provision is broader than the comparable federal self-incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment.

That privilege has

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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been held to apply only to evidence which is of a testimonial
or communicative nature.

In Schmerber v. California, supra,

the Fifth Amendment was expressly held not to apply to blood
samples involuntarily taken from an arrestee.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has held that Article I,
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah does apply
to evidence of a non-testimonial or non-communicative nature.
In State v. Sirmey, 40 Utah 525, 122 P.748 (1912), testimony
was received which compared the shoes of the defendant with
footprints found at a murder scene.

The Court found:

It is generally held, and as stated in 12 Cye. 402,
that although evidence, including documents and
other articles, may have been obtained in a
criminal case by unfair or illegal methods, it
is nevertheless, as a general rule, admissible if
relevant, provided the accused is not thereby
compelled to do any act which incriminates him,
and the confession or incriminating admission is
not extorted from him; and by the weight of
authority it is held to be error to compel
the accused to submit to a comparison of
footprints and to permit a witness who was
present when the accused was forcibly compelled
to place his foot in footprints, or to surrender
his shoes for the purpose of making a comparison,
to testify as to the result; by where the accused
voluntarily places his foot in the tracks, or
surrenders his shoes to the sheriff, he cannot
object to evidence that they seemed to fit.
122 P. at 748.
In that case, the Court went on to find that there was no com·
pulsion involved, because the defendant gave the police officei
his shoes upon the officer's request to make the comparison.
The only other case in Utah dealing with the question of
a defendant giving evidence against himself is State v. Van D~
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554 P.2d 1324 (1976).

In that case the defendant was requested

to give hair samples to the police to compare with samples found
at the scene of a rape.

He was also requested to give blood

samples and fingerprints to the police, all of which were
admitted in evidence.

The Court emphasized the compulsion

factor stating:
As to state and federal constitutional provisions
mentioned, defendant was not compelled to give
(a) evidence, (b) or be a witness against himself.
Yne officers relieved him of the hair (without
any resistance). Under such circumstances the
cases say no constitutional rights are violated.
[Emphasis by the Court, footnote omitted]
524 P.2d at 1325.
In both of these cases, before the Court could logically
reach the compulsion issue it had to find that the items requested were within the protections of Article I, Section 12.
The blood sample taken from the appellant in the case at hand
is obviously within those same protections.

The case at hand

is distinguished from State v. Van Darn, supra, and State v.
Sirrnay, supra, in that in those cases the evidence was relinquished upon request by policy officers.

In the case at hand,

appellant was compelled to give a blood sample.

The arresting

officer told appellant he would take a blood sample with or
without appellant's consent and if appellant did not submit
to the test the sample would be taken by force (T.54, Vol.I).
Consequently, the appellant was compelled to give evidence
against himself in violation of his privilege against selfincrimination as described in Article I, Section 12 of the
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Constitution of the State of Utah.
The blood sample taken from appellant violated appellant's
rights to be free from unreasonable searches as guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
violated his right not to be compelled to give evidence against
himself as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Constitu·
tion of the State of Utah.

Because the Court erred in not

granting appellant's motion to suppress the results of the bloc
alcohol analysis,

this Court should reverse the conviction and

set it aside.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE
RESULTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST BECAUSE THE
STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF
SUCH TEST.
Utah Code Ann.

§41-6-44.5

(1953 as amended) provides:

41-6-44.5.
Driving while intoxicated--Chemical
tests as evidence--Presumption of blood alcohol
level.--In any action or proceeding in which
it is material to prove that a person was driving
under the influence of alcohol, the results of
a chemical test or tests as authorized in 41-644.10 shall be admitted as evidence if the chemcial
was taken within one hour of the alleged incident.
The level of the alcohol determined to be in
the blood by the chemical test shall be presumed
to be not less than the blood alcohol level of
the person at the time of the incident.
If the
chemcial test was not taken within one hour
after the alleged incident, the evidence of the
amount of alcohol in the person's blood as shown
by the chemical test is admissible if expert
testimony extablishes its probative value and
the results of said test may be given prima facie
effect if established by expert testimony.
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The accident appellant was involved in occurred at approximately 1:00 p.m. on July 28, 1977 (T.85, Vol.II).

The

blood sample for a blood alcohol test was withdrawn from
appellant at 2:35 p.m. approximately one and a half hours
after the accident (T. 76, Vol. III).

Appellant contends that

the probative value of the test was not established by the
expert testimony and therefore the results of the blood alcohol
test should not have been admitted into evidence.
Lynn Davis, a chemist for the City-County Health Department
of Salt Lake County, testified, over the objection of counsel,
that the blood sample taken from appellant at 2:35 p.m. contained 0.28% alcohol by weight (T.90, Vol.III).

In an effort

to relate back the figure to the time of the accident, the
State called Clark Bowles, a sergeant with the Highway Patrol
in charge of the Breathalyzer Project for the State of Utah.
Officer Bowles testified to alcohol absorbtion rates and burn
off rates in the body (T.110-111, Vol.III).

Officers Bowles

testified that in order to extrapolate the blood alcohol test
back to a certain time, it was necessary to know when the
individual last had something to drink (T.117-118, Vol.III).
There was no evidence presented as to when appellant had had
his last drink.

Mr. Bowles testified that without knowing

when the last drink was taken, he could not say with certainty
what the blood alcohol level was at a given time (T.144, Vol.
III).
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Under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5

(1953 as amended), the

State's burden was to establish the probative value of the bloc
test in proving what the level of appellant's intoxication was
at the time of the accident.

Since the testimony of the expert

witnesses introduced by the State failed to show what appellant
blood alcohol level may have been when the accident occurred,
the State failed to meet its burden.

Thus,

the admission of

the results of the blood alcohol test was error.
Under Utah Rules of Evience, Rule 4, a verdict may be
set aside on the grounds of erroneous admission of evidence
only where there is a timely and specific objection interposed
and the reviewing court finds that the evidence should have
been excluded and probably had a substantial effect on the
verdict.

In this case, appellant's counsel objected to the

admission of the results of the blood test on the ground that:
probative value of such evidence had not been established under
Utah Code Ann.

§41-6-44.5

by the testimony of Lynn Davis as

an expert witness (T.89, Vol.III).

The objection was overrule1

(T. 89, Vol. III).
Appellant submits that the evidence should have been
excluded on the ground stated in his objection.

Utah Code Ann

$41-6-44.5 provides that the results of a blood alcohol test
which was conducted more than one hour after the incident in
question are admissible in evidence only if the "probative
value" of such evidence is established by expert testimony.
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The term "probative value" has been defined by this Court as
evidence tending to prove an issue.
9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947).

State v. Scott, 111 Utah

In the case of Liquor Control

Conunission v. Bartolas, 225 N.E. 2d 859 (1963), the Ohio
Court wrote:
Probative evidence is testimony of substance
and relevant consequences not vague or uncertain,
but having the quality of proof or fitness to
induce conviction of truth, and has reference
to the substance of the testimony generally
and not the credibility of the witness .
225 N.E.2d 859, 862. See also Hunnicutt v.
Boughner, 231 N.E.2d 159 (Ind. 1967).
Appellant contends that the testimony of Lynn Davis and
Officer Bowles failed to establish that the results of the
blood alcohol test proved what appellant's blood alcohol level
was at the time of the accident.

The only way that such evidence

could have been shown to have "probative value" as tending to
prove appellant's blood alochol level at the relevant time was
to establish that the expert could scientifically relate the
results of the actual blood test back to the time of the accident.

Officer Bowles testified that he could not establish

with any degree of certainty what appellant's blood alcohol
level was at the time of the accident without knowing when
appellant took his last drink (T.144, Vol.III).

No evidence

was presented as to when the last drink was taken.

The evidence

of the results of the blood test did not have the "quality of
proof" envisioned in Bartolas, supra.
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Since the testimony of Officer Bowles as an expert
witness failed to establish the probative value of the results
of the blood test, testimony as to those results was not
admissible under the standard established by Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44.5.

The admission of such evidence by the trial

court was error.
Finally, the admission of the results of the blood
alcohol test had a substantial influence upon the finding of
the jury that appellant was under the influence of alcohol at
the time of the accident.

Given that the statutory presumptioi

of intoxication arises at 0. 08%, when the jury heard Lynn Davis
testify that the test revealed a blood acohol level of 0.28%,
they were bound to infer that appellant had been intoxicated
an hour and a half earlier when the accident occurred.

It was

at least possible that appellant consumed more alochol after
the accident occurred (T.31, Vol.I), since he went into his
residence after being arrested by Mr. Harenburg.

Because of

this, the inference that the results of the test established
appellant's intoxication at the time of the accident was unwarranted and prejudicial to appellant's case.
Thus, the admission of evidence as to the results of
the blood alcohol test should not have been admitted and the
admission of such evidence was reversible error under Rule
4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
- 20 -
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POINT III
THE CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT AROSE FROM A SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE
ANN. §76-1-401 (1953 AS AMENDED); CONSEQUENTLY
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA TO SOME OF THE CHARGES
BARRED A SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF THE AUTOMOBILE
HOMICIDE CHARGE.
Appellant was taken before Justice of the Peace Charles
Jones on August 1, 1977, and pleaded guilty to the charges of
Driving Under the Influence, Improper Registration, Driving
Without a Driver's License and No Safety Inspection.

Judge

Jones did not have a complaint but was advised by the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office they would send him a complaint
(M.30).

Before taking his plea, Judge Jones informed appellant

of his right to a trial and his right to counsel (M.10).
Judge Jones then imposed sentence on the appellant for the
charges and sent a commitment to the Salt Lake County Jail
concerning the sentence (M.12-13).
After deciding that he would file Automobile Homicide
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorney petitioned Judge Jones
to set aside appellant's guilty plea, which he did (M.14-15).
Appellant contends his plea to Driving Under the Influence
bars a subsequent prosecution for Automobile Homicide.

Utah

Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended) provides:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising
out of a single criminal episode;
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(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote
justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b)
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant
is arraigned on the first information or
indictment.

Appellant has met the statutory requirement of the sing
episode rule.

All of the offenses charged were within the

jurisdiction of a single court--the District Court.

Further

more, it is arguable that all offenses were known to the pro

cutor's office at the time appellant was arraigned before Ju
Jones on August 1, 1977.

Judge Jones that day spoke with a

clerk in the County Attorney's Office after appellant was br
before him without a formal complaint.

Later on, he spoke w

Michael Christensen of the County Attorney's Office who assu
him that a complaint would be forthcoming (M.8-9,30).

On th

basis, Judge Jones accepted appellant's pleas (M.11-12).

Ye

the deceased passed away at 8:30 p.m. on July 28, 1977, one
and one half days before appellant was arraigned before the
Justice of the Peace (T.54, Vol.II).

It was not until Augus

3, 1977, two days after appellant's arraignment and pleas of
guilty, that the County Attorney filed Automobile Homicide
charges against appellant, and petitioned Judge Jones to vac
and set aside appellant's pleas of guilty (M.15,65).
Appellant is aware that a similar argument has been mad
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and rejected by this Court in State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693
(1978).

Appellant contends that the opinion in that case was

erroneous, that the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan
should be adopted by this Court, and that Cooley should be
overruled based upon the meaning set forth by Justice Maughan:
Section 76-1-402(2) confers a valuable right on
one charged with multiple offenses under a single
criminal episode--he is not compelled to face
the emotional trauma and expense of several trials,
if his circumstances fall within the qualifying
terms. Even under the reasoning of the majority
opinion in State v. Johnson. the jurisdiction
of the district court could be invoked, for
the justice of the peace would not have jurisdiction (would not be qualified) to try ali the
offenses charged. Furthermore, Sec. 76-1-402(2),
is a later enactment, conferring a substantive
right, and it should be held, if it be necessary,
to modify an earlier, procedural enactment.
575 P.2d at 696.
Appellant's guilty plea to the charges should have been
a bar to any subsequent prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court's
admission of blood test results obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights and without requiring the State to
establish the probative value of such tests, and its failure
to apply the single episode rule to bar the prosecution of
Automobile Homicide contribute reversible error.

Appellant

requests that this Court reverse the verdict of the jury and
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the judgment entered thereon, and remand the instant case
to the Third Judicial District Court with instructions to
dismiss the Information.
DATED this

~~day

of November, 1979.

RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Appellant
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